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The Supreme Court Limits
Lawsuits AgainstManaged
Care Organizations
Although a win for the managed care industry, the Davila case also is
a compromise of sorts and puts the ball back in Congress’s court.
by Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
ABSTRACT: In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, the United States Supreme Court revisited the
question of whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) precludes state
lawsuits against ERISA plans. The Court held that ERISA preempts damage actions brought
against managed care organizations under the Texas Health Care Liability Act because
ERISA itself provides the exclusive remedy for challenging ERISA plans’ coverage decisions.
The Court suggested, however, that health plans might be liable for treatment decisions
made by employed physicians. It also volleyed back to Congress the question of whether
ERISA beneficiaries should have any remedy for damages caused by coverage decisions.
O
n 21 june 2004 the u. s . supreme court decided the combined cases
of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila and CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc. v. Calad, holding
that beneficiaries of employment-related managed care plans cannot sue
those plans for damages under state law when the beneficiaries have been injured
as a result of coverage denial decisions. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a
unanimous Court, concluded that the remedial provisions of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 provide the only judicial remedies
available to an ERISA plan beneficiary under these circumstances. Davila rounds
out a series of Supreme Court decisions examining the roles of federal and state
law in overseeing managed care decision making under ERISA. Davila effectively
insulates employment-related health plans from tort liability for the consequences
of their utilization review decisions, provider network limitations, and formulary
provisions unless and until Congress decides to act on a managed care bill of
rights. The Court leaves open, however, the possibility of state tort suits against
managed care plans that deliver treatment directly.
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The Legal Context
The Davila and Calad decisions were part of a larger case decided by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002 under the title Roark v. Humana.1 All four plaintiffs
in that combined case had sued their managed care plans under the Texas Health
Care Liability Act (THCLA), which, like statutes in nine other states, authorizes
lawsuits for injuries suffered because of negligent managed care plan decisions.
Ruby Calad, insured with CIGNA through her husband’s work, underwent a hys-
terectomy with rectal, bladder, and vaginal repair. She was discharged from the
hospital after one day pursuant to the decision of CIGNA’s discharge nurse, even
though her doctor recommended a longer stay. Calad suffered complications re-
quiring a return to the emergency room a few days later, which she claimed were
due to her early release. She sued CIGNA under the THCLA, claiming that CIGNA
had failed to use ordinary care in making its medical necessity decision and that
“CIGNA’s system made substandard care more likely.”
Juan Davila, who received coverage from Aetna through his employer’s health
plan, was prescribed Vioxx by his primary care physician for arthritis pain. Aetna
required Davila to enter its “step program,” using two different medications before
it would approve coverage of Vioxx. After three weeks of taking naprosyn (a
cheaper pain reliever), Davila was rushed to the emergency room with bleeding ul-
cers. Davila remained in critical care for five days and was not thereafter able to
take any pain medication absorbed through the stomach. Davila sued Aetna under
the THCLA, raising claims identical to those raised by Calad.
Both cases were dismissed by the district court, which held that the THCLA
claims were completely “preempted” by ERISA. That is, the remedies provided by
ERISA’s section 502(a) are the only remedies available to plan members for chal-
lenging plan decisions, and all alternative or additional state remedies are ex-
cluded. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Davila and
Calad were essentially suing their managed care plans for malpractice and that
ERISA did not preempt these claims because ERISA itself provides no remedy for
malpractice.
The Supreme Court reversed the Appeals Court, reinstating the district court
judgments.2 The Court held that ERISA’s section 502 (29 U.S.C., sec. 1132) indeed
provides the exclusive remedy for a plan beneficiary denied coverage by an ERISA
plan. Under 502, Davila and Calad could have either paid for the services they
needed and sued their plan for the cost of those services, or sued for an injunction
to force their plans to pay for the services initially. Their THCLA claims, the Court
held, were based on their plans’ coverage denials. The THCLA was, therefore, an
invalid attempt to provide an alternative or supplemental state remedy for the
remedies ERISA provides for improper coverage determinations. The plaintiffs’
THCLA claims, according to the Court, should have been removed into federal
court, where they should have been dismissed because of ERISA preemption.
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The History Of ERISA Preemption
To make sense of the Supreme Court’s decision, it is necessary to understand
the long and tangled history of ERISA preemption. Congress’s primary concern in
adopting ERISA in 1974 was with defaults and administrative malfeasance in pen-
sion funds, and most of ERISA’s provisions address these problems. ERISA gov-
erns not only pension plans but also employee welfare benefit plans—including
health plans. But ERISA not only subjects employment-related welfare benefit
plans to federal regulation, it also largely removes them from state oversight.
Section 514 specifies that the provisions of ERISA shall, except as otherwise
provided, “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.” It further defines “State law” to include “all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.”
This extremely broad language was added to ERISA at the last minute in confer-
ence committee, replacing earlier language that had merely preempted state regu-
lation of subject matters specifically addressed by ERISA.3 It was apparently
added at the behest of unions, which were concerned about state taxation and
regulation of pension funds and regulation of prepaid legal services plans.
Section 514 of ERISA is, however, subject to several exceptions. Most impor-
tantly, it exempts from preemption “any law of any State which regulates insur-
ance, banking, or securities.” This “savings clause,” requested by the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), reflects the tradition that
insurance regulation is left to the states. The savings clause is also subject to its
own exception—the “deemer clause”: “Neither an employee benefit plan…nor any
trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company
or other insurer” subject to state regulation under the savings clause.
ERISA preemption is not limited, however, to the express language of 514. Sec-
tion 502 of ERISA (which was at issue in Davila and Calad) allows a participant or
beneficiary to sue (1) “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan”; (2) to compel a plan fiduciary to make good
to a plan losses caused by a breach of fiduciary duties; and (3) to obtain an injunc-
tion or “other appropriate equitable relief” to enforce ERISA or the terms of a plan.
The Supreme Court has held that this “comprehensive and reticulate scheme” of
ERISA remedies leaves no scope for the creation of state remedies against ERISA
plans and thus preempts any such remedies.
From the outset, the Supreme Court read the preemptive scope of 514 and 502
very broadly. In its first case interpreting 514, the Court held that Congress
“meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern” and
that ERISA preempts not just state laws that directly regulate pension plans, but
also laws that indirectly affect them.4 In its next 514 case, the Court turned to the
dictionary to define 514’s scope: A law “relates to” a benefit plan “if it has a connec-
tion with or reference to such a plan.”5 The Court also identified the purpose of
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ERISA preemption: to avoid “the need for interstate employers to administer their
plans differently in each State in which they have employees.”6
Two years later in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Massachusetts the Supreme
Court interpreted ERISA’s savings and deemer clauses in a case addressing for the
first time ERISA’s effect on a law regulating health insurance. The Court held that
a Massachusetts statute mandating minimum mental health benefits was a “law
which regulates insurance” and was thus saved from preemption and enforceable.7
The Court also noted that the “deemer” clause freed “uninsured” (that is, self-
insured) plans from state regulation, a position that it developed in later cases.
The Supreme Court set the stage for its interpretation of 502 preemption, and
thus eventually for Davila, in Massachusetts Mutual Life v. Russell.8 Russell, a plan bene-
ficiary, had sued her disability insurer claiming that she had been injured because
her ERISA plan had wrongfully denied and delayed disability benefits. She sued,
claiming compensatory and punitive damages under 502(a)(2), which provides a
civil remedy for enforcing another provision of ERISA, section 409(a), which in
turn authorizes “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem ap-
propriate” to sanction breaches of fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court rejected her
claim, holding that 409(a) does not afford relief to individuals but only provides
remedies for the benefit of a plan itself. The Court further held, moreover, that
there is no authorization anywhere in 502(a) for individual “extracontractual”
damages (that is, damages in excess of the value of the benefits denied), observing:
The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted…provide
strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly. The assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration
of ERISA’s interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a “com-
prehensive and reticulated statute.”9
The Court confronted the ramifications of 502’s comprehensive remedial
scheme for preemption of state law in 1987 in Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux.10
Pilot Life also involved a claim against a disability insurer for “mental and emo-
tional distress” and “punitive and exemplary damages” for wrongful termination
of disability benefits. Dedeaux, however, sued under state law for tortious breach
of contract because the Court’s decision in Russell had blocked access to such dam-
ages under ERISA itself. The Court found that 514 preemption applied to this claim
and that Mississippi’s bad-faith breach-of-contract law was not “specifically di-
rected” toward the insurance industry and thus not saved from preemption.
The Court could have stopped there. It went on, however, to observe that Con-
gress had intended 502(a) to provide the exclusive remedy for “plan participants
and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits and that
varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of 502(a) would pose an
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.”11 Explicating the remedial
structure of 502, and citing Russell, the Court held that ERISA left no room for
state suits for extracontractual damages. The Court claimed that Congress had in-
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tended to “displace entirely any state cause of action” and make any ERISA suit
“purely a creature of federal law.”12 The Court suggested that even if Dedeaux’s
cause of action had been saved from 514 preemption, it would have still be pre-
empted under 502, because it conflicted with the “clear expression of congressio-
nal intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme be exclusive.”13
In Metropolitan Life v. Taylor, a second ERISA preemption case decided the same
day, the Court further applied to ERISA claims a third form of preemption also at
issue in Davila: “complete preemption.”14 Under this doctrine, any case that could
be brought against an ERISA plan as a 502 benefits claim is a claim “arising under
the laws of the United States.” If it is brought in state court, therefore, the defen-
dant can, under settled law of federal jurisdiction, remove the case into federal
court, even if ERISA is nowhere mentioned in the plaintiff’s complaint.
By the end of the 1980s, therefore, the Court had established a number of rules
governing ERISA preemption and claims: (1) Section 514 broadly preempts any
state law that refers to or is connected with an ERISA plan. (2) Section 514’s “sav-
ings clause” saves from preemption state laws that regulate insurance. (3) Self-
insured plans are not subject to state insurance regulation. (4) State law claims di-
rected at ERISA plans that could be brought as claims for benefits are preempted
by Section 502 and can be removed into federal court, where they will be dis-
missed. (5) ERISA itself does not provide any “extracontractual” damages for inju-
ries caused by claim denials.
Challenges To The Preemption Paradigm
The 1990s brought two challenges to this paradigm. First, the nature of health
care benefits began to change dramatically. Although prepaid health care had ex-
isted in 1974, the predominant model of health insurance through much of the
1980s provided retroactive fee-for-service reimbursement for services provided.
ERISA benefit cases were essentially disputes over whether an ERISA plan, a pro-
vider, or a patient would be stuck with the cost of a service already rendered.
As the 1990s progressed, employee health benefit plans became managed care
plans. Claims disputes were no longer arguments about payment for a service ren-
dered but rather about whether the service would be provided at all or in a timely
fashion. This was most obviously true in staff-model health maintenance organi-
zations (HMOs), where staff physicians decided which services to provide to pa-
tients, but it was also true when utilization reviewers refused to approve coverage
for a proposed procedure or for a continued hospitalization, or when network lim-
itations delayed access to services or steered patients to inferior or inappropriate
providers or products. The traditional 502 remedy—recovery of the cost of the
service denied—became woefully inadequate when the injury the patient suffered
was not a denial or payment but rather loss of life or permanent disability because
a plan had refused to provide or approve necessary care.
Under state tort law, managed care plans could be held responsible for injuries
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suffered by their members from negligent coverage decisions.15 When ERISA ben-
eficiaries sued their plans in state court, however, the cases were removed into
federal court under the complete preemption doctrine and then dismissed alto-
gether because 514 preempted all state laws governing ERISA plans, 502 pre-
empted all state remedies against them, and ERISA itself provided no remedy for
damages beyond the cost of the denied service.16 Lower courts were outraged by
their inability to redress serious injustices, but ERISA’s rules seemed clear.17
At the same time, the Supreme Court began to awaken to the ramifications—
and limits—of its ERISA preemption jurisprudence. In New York State Conference of
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers, the Court confronted a state hospital rate
regulation scheme that required hospitals to charge lower rates to Blue Cross
plans than to commercial or self-insured plans.18 Acknowledging that the scheme
clearly “related to” ERISA plans, the Court recognized that it also fell within the
scope of traditional state health care regulation. Quoting Henry James for the
proposition that “really, universally, relations stop nowhere,” the Court aban-
doned a literal reading of 514 and focused on its purpose. It held that state laws
that only indirectly affect benefit plans are not preempted by ERISA unless the
economic consequences for those plans are too “acute.”
In 2000 and 2002 the Court in Pegram v. Herdrich and Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran directly confronted the implications of ERISA for managed care. In Pegram,
the Court rejected a frontal attack on managed care, holding that the physicians in
a physician-owned and -operated HMO were not acting as ERISA-plan fiduciaries
in making decisions that involved both coverage and treatment and thus were not
obligated under ERISA to make such determinations “solely in the interest” of
plan beneficiaries. The Court observed in dicta that such decisions might be sub-
ject to state malpractice law, a traditional state domain preserved from preemp-
tion by Travelers.19 In Moran, however, the Court held that state laws subjecting
ERISA plans’ decisions to external review were saved from preemption because
the laws regulated insurance.20
At the same time, the lower courts, confronted with cases brought by ERISA
beneficiaries who claimed to be suffering the consequences of negligent managed
care treatment decisions, tried to find a way to provide a remedy. Even before Trav-
elers, it seemed clear that doctors could not escape malpractice liability simply by
working for ERISA HMOs. It was a small stretch to hold ERISA HMOs liable vi-
cariously for the malpractice of their professional employees or of professionals
who they had led their members to believe were their agents.21 In its path-breaking
decision in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals went further,
holding that state tort claims challenging ERISA plans’ treatment decisions af-
fecting the “quality” of care provided to beneficiaries were not preempted, even
though claims challenging coverage decisions affecting the “quantity” of care
were.22 Following the Court’s decision in Pegram, some courts went further yet,
holding that at least some “mixed” ERISA-plan decisions involving coverage of
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treatment options were subject to state negligence lawsuits.23
When confronted with situations where ERISA-plan beneficiaries claimed
simply that they had been injured by their plans’ utilization review decisions de-
nying or delaying coverage for particular procedures or denying access to nonnet-
work providers, most courts held that state tort remedies were preempted by Sec-
tions 502 or 514 of ERISA.24 Pilot Life’s reading of 502 blocked the use of state tort
remedies against ERISA plans for decisions involving only benefit determinations.
This result was very troubling to the courts because, as several judges noted in
concurring or dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court’s position that ERISA itself
provided no federal cause of action for extracontractual damages caused by negli-
gent plan decisions (a reading of the statute that was far from necessary) left ag-
grieved ERISA beneficiaries with neither federal nor state relief.25
The Fifth Circuit’s Davila decision tried to cut the Gordian knot. It simply held
that because 502 does not provide a tort remedy against managed care plans, it
does not block the states from doing so. The Supreme Court decision, however,
held that Pilot Life is still good law and that claims that could be brought against
ERISA plans as claims for benefits under 502 can be removed into federal court,
where any state claims that supplement or supplant the basic claim for benefits
under 502 must be dismissed. The opinion was written by Justice Thomas, who
had dissented in Moran and seemed eager in Davila as well to protect employers
from burdensome state regulations.
The Court rejected all of the reasons given by the Fifth Circuit for evading pre-
emption. Specifically, it held that it did not matter that the THCLA purported to
“create cause of action” for failure to exercise ordinary care, because the THCLA in
fact simply created an alternative remedy for a coverage denial. Any injury caused
by the plan resulted from a coverage decision, not a treatment decision, and thus
had to be redressed, if at all, under ERISA. It did not matter that the Texas law reg-
ulated insurance and thus was saved from 514 preemption, since 502 independ-
ently preempts alternative or additional state remedies. Most importantly, the
Court distinguished Pegram, in which it had suggested that mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions might be subject to state regulation, or even malpractice liti-
gation. The Court noted that Pegram involved a physician-owned and -operated
HMO and that the physicians in Pegram were acting as treating physicians as well
as benefit administrators. The Court noted that in the Davila and Calad cases,
where the decisionmakers were neither treating physicians nor their employers,
coverage decisions were pure eligibility decisions, governed by ERISA and not
subject to state malpractice law.
Issues Resolved And Unresolved
Davila clarifies a great deal, although it also leaves some questions unresolved.
First, it draws a clear line between managed care plans that are owned and oper-
ated by treating physicians or provide care through their own employed physi-
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cians, and plans that merely impose coverage constraints on independent provid-
ers through coverage rules or decisions. The former are subject to direct and
vicarious liability under state malpractice law; the latter are protected from state
tort liability by ERISA. This distinction mirrors the quality/quantity distinction
recognized in Dukes, but it focuses on the relationship of the decisionmaker to the
patient rather than on the nature of the decision. This will create yet another in-
centive for employers and managed care plans to move away from tighter staff-
model HMOs to preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and looser HMO or
point-of-service (POS) arrangements.26 This trend has already been under way for
some time for other reasons but is likely to become even stronger after Davila.
Second, Davila makes excruciatingly clear that as to plans that do not provide
care through their own professionals, to quote Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s con-
curring opinion, “a ‘regulatory vacuum’ exists: [V]irtually all state law remedies
are preempted but very few federal substitutes are provided.”27 If one believes that
managed care organizations, like everyone else, should be legally accountable
when they injure others and that legal responsibility can deter ill-considered ac-
tions, this situation is problematic.
Third, Davila clarifies what the Court sees as the limits that ERISA places on
the regulation of health plans. In Moran, a narrow majority of the Court went out
on a limb in terms of ERISA precedent to uphold state external review statutes.
Davila also refers approvingly to the recently implemented Department of Labor
ERISA claims regulations, which impose internal claims appeals procedures on
ERISA plans. A majority of the Court has concluded, however, that internal and
subsequent external claims review, supplemented by the possibility of a federal
judicial review of coverage denials under 502, is all the relief ERISA allows.28
Fourth, Davila clarifies that ERISA plan administrators are “fiduciaries” with
respect to coverage decisions. This is not necessarily helpful for beneficiaries. Al-
though fiduciaries should discharge their duties “solely in the interest of plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries,” Pegram recognized that ERISA administrators can
have mixed allegiances and must sometimes consider the interests of the plan or
employer who established it.29 Also, unless the Court abandons its earlier prece-
dents prohibiting individual damage recoveries for the breach of ERISA fiduciary
duties, this holding will do little to help specific beneficiaries.
This raises a fifth issue presented by Davila: the possibility of the Court’s allow-
ing broader damages under ERISA itself. This idea has been put forward by a num-
ber of lower court judges in concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as by the
Solicitor General as amicus in Davila itself. The possibility of revisiting this issue
was left open by the Court’s footnote seven, which noted the issue but stated that
it was not before the Court. It was also enthusiastically endorsed in a concurring
opinion by Justice Ginsburg. The fact that only Justice Stephen Breyer joined her
in this opinion, however, strongly suggests that a majority of the Court does not
share her enthusiasm for revisiting this issue.
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Looking To Congress For The Policy Resolution
This leads to the final ramification of Davila. If anyone is going to permit tort ac-
tions to be brought against managed care organizations, it will have to be Con-
gress. Congress can amend ERISA and indeed seemed to be very close to doing so
in September 2001 before Osama bin Ladin changed the subject. President George
W. Bush presided over the enactment of the THCLA as governor of Texas (al-
though he let it become law without his signature) and advocated its adoption as a
national model in the 2000 debates. But he seems unlikely to advocate a tort rem-
edy against managed care plans in his 2004 reelection campaign. Imposing liabil-
ity on managed care plans would also seem to run counter to the current drive to
cap liability against physicians. Perhaps even more importantly, times have
changed, and market forces operating in the shadow of the law may have brought
about a kinder, gentler form of managed care that litigators who brought cases like
Davila had hoped would be brought about by the courts (although this offers little
comfort to those like Davila and Calad who were injured in the past by managed
care decisions).30 If employers move toward consumer-driven health care, plans’ li-
ability could be even less salient as a political issue. Most importantly,
policymakers seem more concerned about the possibility of employers’ dropping
insurance coverage—which many argue would be exacerbated by the higher costs
imposed by plan liability—than about protecting ERISA-plan beneficiaries from
rationing decisions. Thus, congressional action does not seem likely.
Davila is unlikely to be the Supreme Court’s last word on ERISA. The Court may
revisit the question of the availability of extracontractual remedies under ERISA,
as Justice Ginsburg urges it to. And the Court’s characterization of utilization re-
view decisions as fiduciary decisions leaves open questions as to the scope of judi-
cial review of those decisions.31 But Davila may well represent a final resolution of
sorts for the basic conundrums of ERISA preemption. Under the savings clause,
states are largely free to regulate the terms and conditions of insured ERISA plans,
although they cannot regulate self-insured plans. The states may not, however, al-
low ERISA plan members to sue their plans for damages for coverage decisions,
except where the coverage decision is made by a treating physician who is em-
ployed by the plan. Although Davila is clearly a win for the managed care industry,
the Court’s resolution of the preemption conundrum is also a compromise of sorts,
affording some protection to plan beneficiaries but also encouraging employer
sponsorship of benefit plans and protecting ERISA plans from tort judgments that
would likely drive up premiums. It may very well be the final resolution of the
problem of ERISA preemption for some time to come.
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